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Symptom-Based Gun Control 
FREDRICK E. VARS 
People out of touch with reality should not have guns.  This 
Article proposes empowering police officers to take away guns and 
gun rights from individuals suffering from delusions or 
hallucinations.  This proposal is inspired by the Navy Yard shooting, 
but is also supported by evidence showing a correlation between 
these psychotic symptoms and violence.  The proposal is 
constitutional because of this correlation and for other reasons.  For 
example, the motivating principle behind the right to bear arms is self-
defense; a criminal defendant may only invoke self-defense if he 
“reasonably” feared great bodily harm, and such a fear is not 
“reasonable” if premised on a delusion or hallucination.  Hence, 
individuals suffering from psychotic symptoms cannot be trusted to 
exercise their Second Amendment rights responsibly.
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Symptom-Based Gun Control 
FREDRICK E. VARS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Early in the morning on August 7, 2013, two Newport, Rhode Island, 
police officers responded to a harassment call at a hotel.1  On arrival they 
met with Aaron Alexis,2 who was obviously delusional.  The police 
incident report states that Alexis believed someone had sent three people to 
follow him and keep him awake by talking to him and sending vibrations 
into his body with, in Alexis’s words, “some sort of microwave machine.”3  
Although Alexis reported that he had not personally seen any of these three 
people, he was nonetheless worried that they were “going to harm him.”4  
Less than six weeks later, on September 14, Alexis legally purchased a 
shotgun in Virginia.5  He used it two days later to kill twelve people at the 
Navy Yard in Washington, D.C.6 
Alexis’s paranoid delusions in August should have prevented him 
from purchasing the shotgun in September.  They did not because mental 
health restrictions on firearm purchases are generally keyed to diagnosis or 
treatment, not to symptoms.7  This is a mistake.  The Second Amendment 
protects, first and foremost, the right to defend oneself.8  But a valid claim 
                                                                                                                          
* Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law.  Thanks to Madelon Baranoski, 
Caroline Harada, Ron Krotoszynski, Grace Lee, and Mike Norko for their helpful comments and 
references.  Thanks also to Carol Montgomery and Penny Gibson for their excellent research 
assistance.  The Article also benefited from comments and questions at the University of Connecticut 
Symposium and the 2014 AALS annual meeting. 
1 For a redacted version of the police incident report that followed this encounter, see NEWPORT 
POLICE DEP’T, INCIDENT REPORT: # 13-17827-OF, at 1 (2013), 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/793545/newport-r-i-police-report.pdf. 
2 Id. at 2. 
3 Id.  
4 Id. 
5 Michael S. Schmidt, State Law Prevented Sale of Assault Rifle to Suspect Last Week, Officials 
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at A15. 
6 Ashley Halsey III et al., D.C. Navy Yard Rampage Leaves 14 Dead; Alleged Shooter Killed, 
ID’d as Aaron Alexis, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2013, at A1.  This was just the latest in a long string of 
mass shootings.  See id. (“The Navy Yard shooting marks the seventh time in the past decade that a 
gunman has killed 10 or more people in a single incident.”). 
7 See infra text accompanying notes 11–20. 
8 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (protecting the right to possess a 
handgun in the home for immediate self-defense).  But see William G. Merkel, Uncoupling the 
Constitutional Right to Self-Defense from the Second Amendment: Insights from the Law of War, 45 
CONN. L. REV. 1809, 1818 (2013) (arguing that “the right to self-defense . . . cannot be rooted in the 
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of self-defense requires an objectively reasonable fear of harm.9  Psychotic 
symptoms obviously undermine objectivity.  Furthermore, data suggest 
that psychotic symptoms are more closely correlated with violence than 
psychiatric diagnoses.10  And a symptom-based approach has the potential 
to prevent gun violence by individuals like Alexis who are never diagnosed 
with, or treated for, mental illness.   
This Article proposes that a police officer or mental health 
professional who observes an individual suffering from delusions or 
hallucinations should be empowered to confiscate that person’s firearms 
and to add that person’s name to the federal background check system, 
thus preventing firearm purchases until after a successful appeal or 
restoration proceeding.  An individual seeking to regain gun rights would 
need to submit evidence from a mental health professional showing his 
capacity to possess a firearm, thereby incentivizing rather than penalizing 
treatment.   
Part II of this Article describes current restrictions on gun purchases.  
These restrictions are generally premised on diagnosis or treatment.  They 
leave gaps that have allowed several recent mass shootings and that a 
symptom-based approach could fill.  Part III surveys the literature on 
psychosis and violence and concludes that the weight of authority and most 
applicable studies find a significant positive relationship between the two.  
Part IV argues that this symptom-based proposal is constitutional.  The 
legal analysis also suggests another policy rationale for the proposal: a 
person out of touch with reality cannot be trusted to use a firearm in an 
objectively reasonable manner.  Part V discusses counter-arguments. 
II.  CURRENT RESTRICTIONS ARE BOTH OVER- AND UNDER-INCLUSIVE 
There are three basic regimes restricting gun possession by the 
mentally ill.  Federal law is the first regime, setting the floor by barring 
firearm possession by anyone who is “adjudicated as a mental defective” 
or involuntarily committed.11  Although the exact boundaries of these 
terms may be unclear, a serious mental disorder, insanity, or “marked 
subnormal intelligence” are prerequisites.12  And while mental illness for 
civil commitment purposes is technically a legal, not medical, concept, 
                                                                                                                          
original understanding of the Second Amendment, but that it could plausibly and cogently be based on 
substantive due process, natural law, the Ninth Amendment, and fundamental principles of law that 
emerge from comparative inquiry into foreign and international law”). 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 68–72. 
10 See infra Part III.  
11 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012); see Jana R. McCreary, “Mentally Defective” Language in the 
Gun Control Act, 45 CONN. L. REV. 813, 843–52 (2013) (discussing judicial interpretations of these 
statutory terms). 
12 McCreary, supra note 11, at 843 (citing 27 C.F.R. § 478.11(a) (2010)). 
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legislatures and courts largely incorporate the definition applied by mental 
health professionals.13  Thus, the federal bar rests on psychiatric diagnosis. 
Under the second regime, some states also bar firearm possession by 
individuals who have been subject to voluntary commitment.14  Voluntary 
commitment may entail a loss of liberty, unlike ordinary consensual 
treatment.  For example, a voluntarily admitted patient may not thereafter 
be permitted to leave at-will.  State statutes authorizing voluntary 
admission vary.15  Some even expressly provide that “symptoms of mental 
illness,” short of a diagnosis, can suffice.16  Voluntary commitment no 
doubt captures many people without a formal diagnosis,17 but most people 
with psychotic symptoms are never hospitalized (rightly or wrongly).  In 
2011, 0.8% of adults in the United States received inpatient mental health 
care.18  This included both involuntary and voluntary commitments, along 
with ordinary consensual treatment.  By comparison, one study found that 
5.1% of the general population reported psychotic-like experiences within 
a twelve-month period.19  This illustrates that while some people may be 
voluntarily committed without a diagnosis, many more with severe 
symptoms are neither diagnosed nor hospitalized. 
The third regime is the most restrictive and least common.  Like the 
federal regime, it turns on diagnosis, not symptoms.  For example, Hawaii 
prohibits gun possession by anyone with a “significant” mental illness.20  If 
fully enforced, this sweeping restriction could disqualify roughly 17% to 
20% percent of the overall population based on diagnosis and severity.21 
                                                                                                                          
13 Sherry F. Colb, Insane Fear: The Discriminatory Category of “Mentally Ill and Dangerous,” 
25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 341, 354 (1999). 
14 Fredrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right to Bear Arms?, 
48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 12 (2013). 
15 See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 178–85 
(2005) (listing various state statutes relating to voluntary commitment). 
16 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, § 5123(a) (2012) (authorizing a psychiatrist to admit a 
person who has “symptoms of a mental condition” for observation, diagnosis, or care); id. (referring to 
a Delaware statute regarding voluntary admission, which requires persons with “symptoms of mental 
illness” to obtain a letter from a doctor recommending hospitalization).  
17 But cf. Donald H. Stone, The Benefits of Voluntary Inpatient Psychiatric Hospitalization: Myth 
or Reality?, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 25, 30 (1999) (“The psychiatrist should use the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV to ensure the patient is 
admitted with more than just a suspicion of mental illness.” (footnote omitted)). 
18 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS & 
QUALITY, RESULTS FROM THE 2011 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: MENTAL HEALTH 
FINDINGS 21 (2012).   
19 Ramin Mojtabai, Psychotic-Like Experiences and Interpersonal Violence in the General 
Population, 41 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 183, 184 (2006). 
20 HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7(c)(3) (2013).   
21 See Ronald C. Kessler et al., Prevalence and Treatment of Mental Disorders, 1990 to 2003, 352 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2515, 2518 (2005) (comparing two studies of mental disorders and reporting that 
“serious” disorders were prevalent in 5.3% to 6.3% of the population, while “moderate” disorders were 
prevalent in 12.3% to 13.5% of the population). 
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All three current regimes are premised at least in part on the belief 
that people with mental illness, or suspected mental illness, are dangerous.  
Findings are mixed, but there does appear to be an elevated risk of violence 
across many, but perhaps not all, psychiatric diagnoses.22  Even the far-
reaching Hawaii law is supported by research, although it disqualifies 
thousands of individuals who would not engage in violence with a 
firearm.23 
The narrower approach of some states—disqualifying both voluntary 
and involuntary psychiatric inpatients—has stronger support.  A leading 
study found that 11.5% of individuals discharged from inpatient 
psychiatric care perpetrated an act of violence against others during an 
initial follow-up period, as compared with 4.6% in a community control 
group.24  Yet even this level of intervention is overbroad in the sense that 
88.5% of released individuals who received inpatient treatment committed 
no acts of violence.  The federal regime has the strongest support.  A 
follow-up study using the same dataset found that involuntary admission 
status was a significant risk factor for violence.25 
My primary question is not whether existing diagnosis- and treatment-
based restrictions should be retained, but whether they can be 
supplemented.  The aforementioned studies contain several reasons to 
think that adding differently targeted measures makes sense.  First, it 
                                                                                                                          
22 See Bruce G. Link et al., Real in Their Consequences: A Sociological Approach to 
Understanding the Association Between Psychotic Symptoms and Violence, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 316, 
323–24 (1999) (finding that “fighting and weapon use is substantially and significantly elevated among 
people with psychotic and bipolar disorder,” but that people diagnosed with major depression or 
anxiety disorders are no more likely than the general public without mental illness to engage in 
violence); Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: Evidence 
from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 761, 765 
(1990) (explaining a study that showed “[t]he prevalence of affective disorder was three times higher 
among respondents who were violent,” and that “[t]he same was true for the prevalence of 
schizophrenia,” but that “the difference was less pronounced for the prevalence of anxiety disorder”); 
Richard Van Dorn et al., Mental Disorder and Violence: Is There a Relationship Beyond Substance 
Use?, 47 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 487, 490 (2012) (showing that all 
classifications of mental illness . . . elevate violence risk compared to those with no disorders”). 
23 See Vars & Young, supra note 14, at 16–18 (referencing a study finding that persons with 
serious mental illness were 3.5 times more likely to report violent behavior than those without mental 
illness, yet arguing that the Hawaii statute nonetheless suffers from being overbroad). 
24 Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric Inpatient 
Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393, 399 tbl.5 
(1998).  As discussed shortly, see infra note 28 and accompanying text, this effect actually appears to 
be attributable to the comorbidity of psychiatric illness and substance abuse. 
25 Henry J. Steadman et al., A Classification Tree Approach to the Development of Actuarial 
Violence Risk Assessment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 83, 88 tbl.1 (2000).  But cf. JOHN Q. LA FOND & 
MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 145 (1992) (suggesting that differences in the levels of dangerousness between 
voluntary and involuntary patients are diminishing); Fredrick E. Vars, Illusory Consent: When an 
Incapacitated Patient Agrees to Treatment, 87 OR. L. REV. 353, 355, 364 (2008) (questioning validity 
of consent to hospitalization). 
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appears that not every diagnosis carries an increased risk of violence, so 
Hawaii’s law may be too broad.26  Second, the high level of violence 
observed in the community control group of a leading study of inpatients, 
mentioned above,27 suggests that restrictions broader than those under 
federal law could prevent much more violence.  The same study also noted 
that the elevated level of violence across all inpatients disappeared when 
those with substance abuse problems were excluded.28  This suggests that 
targeting attributes other than, or in addition to, diagnosis could more 
efficiently reduce violence.29 
The most fundamental shortcoming of diagnosis and treatment-based 
restrictions is that they require a diagnosis or treatment.  Millions of people 
with mental illness are not diagnosed and do not receive treatment.30  In 
2011, only 38.2% of people with any mental illness and 59.6% of those 
with serious mental illness received mental health treatment.31  Even where 
treatment is available and taken advantage of, it may be too late for a 
person experiencing his first psychotic episode.  Troubled individuals like 
Alexis may interact with law enforcement, and even health care providers, 
without receiving a diagnosis or inpatient treatment. 
III.  EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR A SYMPTOM-BASED APPROACH 
There is room for improvement beyond current diagnosis- and 
treatment-based restrictions on gun possession.  One possible approach is 
to focus directly on symptoms.  Delusions and hallucinations appear to 
have been present in a string of recent mass shootings, including those in 
the Navy Yard,32 Aurora,33 and Tucson.34  The data suggest that the 
                                                                                                                          
26 That is to say, the law is too broad if the only goal is to prevent violence toward others.  The 
stronger, and to my mind, sufficient justification for Hawaii’s ban is suicide prevention.  See Vars & 
Young, supra note 14, at 19–20 (observing that states with low household gun ownership rates have 
lower suicide figures than states with high household gun ownership rates). 
27 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
28 Steadman et al., supra note 24, at 400.  But cf. Van Dorn et al., supra note 22, at 492 (reporting 
that, by comparison to the general population, the risk of serious violence was 2.39 times greater in 
individuals with severe mental illness alone, while the risk was 10.01 times greater for individuals who 
also had a substance use disorder). 
29 Substance abuse problems can rise to the level of psychiatric disorder, AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 481 (5th ed. 2013), but 
generally do not subject individuals to involuntary hospitalization, see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-1.1(1) 
(2013) (“Mental illness, as used herein, specifically excludes the primary diagnosis of epilepsy, mental 
retardation, substance abuse, including alcoholism, or a developmental disability.”); id. § 22-52-10.4 
(listing “mental illness” as prerequisite for involuntary commitment). 
30 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 18, at 25. 
31 Id. at 23.   
32 See supra text accompanying notes 1–6. 
33 Erica Goode et al., Before Gunfire, Hints of “Bad News,” N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2012, at A1. 
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relationship between delusions and violence is not merely anecdotal. 
Delusions appear to correlate with violence.  One review reported that 
seventeen of twenty studies found a positive relationship between 
delusions and violence.35  A 2006 study using a large dataset representative 
of the non-institutionalized U.S. population eighteen years or older 
concluded that people with “psychotic-like experiences” were 5.72 times 
more likely than others to attack someone with an intent to seriously 
injure.36  “Psychotic-like experiences” included seven varieties of 
hallucinations and delusions.37  Hearing voices, seeing visions, and 
paranoid ideations were the most strongly associated with violence.38  Yet 
disarming every person afflicted by psychotic-like symptoms would be 
admittedly overbroad: one attacker would be correctly disarmed for every 
13.5 sufferers who would not attack another.39   
The 2006 study reported that seventy percent of the individuals with 
psychotic-like experiences had not received mental health care in the past 
year.40  This strongly suggests that disqualification based on diagnosis 
misses many people whose symptoms put them at relatively high risk for 
violence.  And even if treatment had been sought, “it is quite likely that 
only a minority of these experiences would be identified as clinically 
significant symptoms and only a small proportion of the individuals with 
these experiences would be identified as cases of psychotic disorders by a 
                                                                                                                          
34 Joseph Schuman, Jared Lee Loughner Trial: Judge Grants Doctors More Time to Restore 
Accused’s Mental Fitness, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/
06/jared-lee-loughner-trial-mental-competency_n_1258397.html. 
35 Stål Bjørkly, Psychotic Symptoms and Violence Toward Others—A Literature Review of Some 
Preliminary Findings: Part 1. Delusions, 7 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 617, 622 (2002); cf. Stål 
Bjørkly, Psychotic Symptoms and Violence Toward Other—A Literature Review of Some Preliminary 
Findings: Part 2. Hallucinations, 7 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 605, 610 (2002) (demonstrating 
that findings on hallucinations are more evenly mixed).  Compare Dale E. McNiel et al., The 
Relationship Between Command Hallucinations and Violence, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1288, 1290 
(2000) (finding that patients experiencing command hallucinations to hurt others were 2.51 times more 
likely to be violent), with Angela F. Nederlof et al., Threat/Control-Override Symptoms and Emotional 
Reactions to Positive Symptoms as Correlates of Aggressive Behavior in Psychotic Patients, 199 J. 
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 342, 346 (2011) (finding that threat but not control-override symptoms 
made a significant contribution to aggressive behavior). 
36 Mojtabai, supra note 19, at 184, 185; cf. Kevin S. Douglas et al., Psychosis as a Risk Factor for 
Violence to Others: A Meta-Analysis, 135 PSYCHOL. BULL. 679, 691 (2009) (finding the median odds 
ratio for hallucinations/delusions to be 2.31, lower than the 5.72 figure from the population-based 
study).  As will be explained, see infra text accompanying notes 49–53, there are reasons for present 
purposes to prefer the 2006 population-based study to an amalgam of different types of studies. 
37 Mojtabai, supra note 19, at 189.  
38 Id. at 187 tbl.2. 
39 This figure is based on data from the 2006 study.  See id. at 184 (“Psychotic-like experiences 
were reported by 5.1% of adults in the community.”); id. at 185 (finding that 1.5% of participants 
reported attacking someone with the intent of hurting that person).  The full underlying calculation is 
on file with the author. 
40 Id. at 185. 
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clinician.”41   
A very similar study of Japanese adolescents broadly supports the 
findings of the 2006 study, although the observed effects were smaller.  
Overall, those who suffered from psychotic-like experiences were about 
twice as likely as others to engage in interpersonal violence.42  The effect 
remained statistically significant for paranoia and hearing voices even after 
controlling for other variables.43 
An early comparable study from Israel measured weapon use directly 
and concluded that “those who score high on threat/control-override 
symptoms [are] much more likely than those who score low to have 
engaged in fighting and weapon use.”44  This result held even after 
controlling for diagnosis and other psychotic symptoms, as well as a host 
of other variables.45  Indeed, the study concluded that “the threat/control-
override symptoms have primacy over diagnostic distinctions in explaining 
violence.”46  (A very recent study confirmed the significance of threat 
delusions, but not those involving control-override.47)  One implication is 
that symptom-based gun control has the potential to prevent more gun 
violence than diagnosis-based regulation.48  
It should be noted that other studies question the relationship between 
delusions and violence.49  All four of these other studies—including the 
                                                                                                                          
41 Id. at 187.  One might be concerned that, under my proposal, police officers would also miss 
the symptoms.  But the study authors do not question clinicians’ ability to identify the symptoms, only 
that the symptoms would be deemed “clinically significant” or evidence of “psychotic disorders.”  Id.  
Police officers also should be able to identify symptoms, which is all this proposal requires.  
42 Yoshihiro Kinoshita et al., Psychotic-Like Experiences Are Associated with Violent Behavior in 
Adolescents, 126 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 245, 248 tbl.1 (2011). 
43 Id. at 249 tbl.3. 
44 Link et al., supra note 22, at 325; see id. at 330 (stating that the “Threat/Control-Override 
Symptoms Subscale” asked how often the subject felt that (1) “your mind was dominated by forces 
beyond your control?” (2) “thoughts were put into your head that were not your own?” and (3) “there 
were people who wished to do you harm?”). 
45 Id. at 326 tbl.3. 
46 Id. at 329; see also Bruce G. Link & Ann Stueve, Psychotic Symptoms and the Violent/Illegal 
Behavior of Mental Patients Compared to Community Controls, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: 
DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 137, 154 tbl.7 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1996) 
(reporting that the patient variable lost statistical significance in predicting weapon use when the 
psychotic symptom variable, which was highly significant, was introduced into a regression model). 
47 Jeremy W. Coid et al., The Relationship Between Delusions and Violence: Findings from the 
East London First Episode Psychosis Study, 70 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 465, 466 (2013).  Delusions of 
being spied on, persecution, and conspiracy were statistically significant in being associated with 
violence, although the study suggests that the anger produced by such delusions was a mediating cause 
of violence.  Id. at 468.  Note that Alexis experienced precisely these types of delusions.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 3–4.  
48 See Bruce G. Link et al., The Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients Reconsidered, 57 
AM. SOC. REV. 275, 283 tbl.1 (1992) (charting the percentage of patients engaging in violent or illegal 
behavior based on patient status and type of behavior). 
49 See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Violence and Delusions: Data from the MacArthur Violence 
Risk Assessment Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 566, 566 (2000) (“To demonstrate that delusions can 
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leading study funded by the MacArthur Foundation—examined highly 
selected groups as opposed to populations.  This is an important 
distinction.  Take, for example, the MacArthur study: it included 
individuals who were recently released from civil commitment.50  Because 
dangerousness is a prerequisite for continued involuntary hospitalization51 
and because there is tremendous pressure to release inpatients as soon as 
possible,52 many subjects likely were just below a maximum risk threshold 
at the time of release.  It may well have been an artifact of sample 
selection, not lack of causation, that those with and without psychotic 
symptoms were equally safe.53  The population studies, although far from 
perfect, are therefore more persuasive for present purposes. 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A SYMPTOM-BASED APPROACH 
A.  Second Amendment 
As I have elsewhere argued, there are at least three possible Second 
Amendment tests for mental health gun regulations: reasonableness, 
intermediate scrutiny, and something close to strict scrutiny.54  The data 
cited above almost certainly clear the low “reasonableness” hurdle because 
it is reasonable for the legislature to conclude that people with delusions or 
hallucinations are more dangerous than others.  On the other hand, strict 
scrutiny would likely be fatal: a measure that disarms one attacker for 
                                                                                                                          
precipitate violence, however, is not to say that delusional persons are necessarily more violent than 
persons with other mental illnesses, or even than their neighbors in the general population.”); Olivier F. 
Colins et al., Psychotic-Like Symptoms as a Risk Factor of Violent Recidivism in Detained Male 
Adolescents, 201 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 478, 482 (2013) (concluding that “by identifying 
detained youths with delusions in general or [paranoid delusions] or [threat/control override delusions] 
in particular, clinicians are likely to identify youths with a low risk for committing repetitive violent 
crimes”); Jeffrey Swanson et al., Violent Behavior Preceding Hospitalization Among Persons with 
Severe Mental Illness, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 201 (1999) (finding that paranoid symptoms and 
psychoticism were not significantly associated with violence, and further suggesting that addressing the 
problems of substance abuse and poor social environments could best prevent violence by severely 
mentally ill persons); Eduardo Henrique Teixeira & Paulo Dalgalarrondo, Violent Crime and 
Dimensions of Delusion: A Comparative Study of Criminal and Noncriminal Delusional Patients, 37 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 225, 225 (2009) (“[C]ontrary to current beliefs, delusional patients who are 
frightened or who have other negative affects associated with delusional ideas appear to commit fewer 
violent acts . . . .”).   
50 Appelbaum et al., supra note 49, at 567.  
51 O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). 
52 See Ira D. Glick et al., Inpatient Psychiatric Care in the 21st Century: The Need for Reform, 62 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 206, 206 (2011) (lamenting the “current model of ultrashort inpatient 
hospitalization” and advocating for a new model of psychiatric care). 
53 See Pamela J. Taylor, Psychosis and Violence: Stories, Fears, and Reality, 53 CAN. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 647, 651 (2008) (concluding after reviewing literature that “there is consistent evidence 
of a general association between delusions and violence,” and dismissing “dissenting studies” on other 
grounds). 
54 Vars & Young, supra note 14, at 3. 
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every 13.5 harmless sufferers is probably not “narrowly tailored.”  The 
outcome under intermediate scrutiny—which has apparently become the 
consensus standard55—is uncertain.  However, courts apply intermediate 
scrutiny only if the restriction “substantially burdens Second Amendment 
rights.”56  And while prohibiting gun purchases by a large subset of the 
population would seem to be a substantial burden and therefore clear this 
threshold, there are good arguments to the contrary. 
First, the proposed restriction on gun purchases is targeted and 
temporary.  Experiencing delusions or hallucinations serious enough to 
come to the attention of a police officer would disqualify an individual 
only until the individual shows that he is no longer suffering from 
psychotic symptoms and is receiving appropriate mental health treatment.  
A comparable Indiana statute disqualifies “dangerous” individuals for 180 
days, with an opportunity thereafter to apply for a restoration of gun 
rights.57  Applying the Indiana Constitution, an appellate court held that 
this statute did not impose a “material burden” on the right to bear arms.58  
A restriction with the possibility of immediate appeal and restoration is 
obviously less burdensome. 
The second argument that this proposal does not amount to a 
substantial burden on Second Amendment rights derives from the purpose 
of the Amendment.  The animating principle of the right to bear arms is 
self-defense.59  In District of Columbia v. Heller60 and McDonald v. City of 
Chicago,61 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down restrictions on handgun 
possession because handguns are “overwhelmingly” favored by the public 
for self-defense.62  Widespread ownership of handguns is a relatively 
recent phenomenon.63  Pistols represented only a relatively small fraction 
                                                                                                                          
55 See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The majority of courts 
have applied an intermediate scrutiny test.”); Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: 
What’s a Court to Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 513 (2012) (“Most courts 
have found that intermediate scrutiny or its equivalent is the proper standard to apply to Second 
Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(9) and similar statutes.”).  
56 Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138. 
57 IND. CODE §§ 35-47-14-6(b), 35-47-14-8(a) (2013); see also Redington v. State, 992 N.E.2d 
823, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that a person can petition for the return of firearms 180 days after 
the firearms are seized). 
58 Redington, 992 N.E.2d at 834.  
59 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (explaining that “individual 
self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment right” (quoting District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008))).   
60 554 U.S. 570. 
61 130 S. Ct. 3020.  
62 Id. at 3036 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 628). 
63 See Marian Wright Edelman & Hattie Ruttenberg, Legislating for Other People’s Children: 
Failing to Protect America’s Youth, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 13 (1995) (noting an increase in 
“[t]he proportion of households owning handguns” and that the number “has risen since 1959 from 
thirteen percent to about twenty-four percent”).  
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of firearms owned by early Americans.64  This is significant because it 
demonstrates that the Court, despite Originalist rhetoric in Heller, 
interprets the Second Amendment through the lens of present 
circumstance.65 
One thing that has changed since ratification of the Second 
Amendment is the definition of self-defense under almost every state’s 
criminal law:   
Generally, both at common law and under modern state penal 
codes, a criminal defendant charged with homicide or assault 
and battery may invoke self-defense to justify the use of 
physical force against another when the defendant 
“reasonably” believes that at the time such force was used, he 
was in imminent danger of losing his life or suffering great 
bodily harm at the hands of such other.66 
Through the early nineteenth century, reasonableness was wholly 
subjective.  If the defendant actually felt threatened, then actions in self-
defense were not criminal, even if no reasonable person would have felt 
threatened in the same situation.  Illustratively, M’Naghten states: “if under 
the influence of his delusion he supposes another man to be in the act of 
attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in 
self-defense, he would be exempt from punishment.”67 
In the mid-nineteenth century, jurisdictions began requiring objective 
reasonableness.68  Significantly, one cause for this movement may have 
been the development of affordable revolvers.69  Because revolvers were 
                                                                                                                          
64 See Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, Pistols, Crime, and Public: Safety in Early 
America, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 699, 706 (2008) (“One analysis of all Plymouth Colony probate 
inventories through the 1670s found that, of 339 listed firearms, 13% were pistols . . . .”).  On the other 
hand, pistols may have been used more frequently than their numbers would suggest.  See id. (“54.5% 
of lead projectiles recovered from Plymouth Colony digs were pistol ammunition.”). 
65 For further scholarship in this vein, see generally Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism 
as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008). 
66 John F. Wagner Jr., Annotation, Standard for Determination of Reasonableness of Criminal 
Defendant’s Belief, for Purposes of Self-Defense Claim, that Physical Force Is Necessary—Modern 
Cases, 73 A.L.R. 4th § 2, at 993 (1989).  One could argue that self-defense may be broader for 
purposes of the Second Amendment than it is under criminal law.  To the contrary, “nothing in Heller 
purports to alter the way the states have defined self-defense.”  State v. Warmus, 967 N.E.2d 1223, 
1237 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
67 See M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 723. 
68 See Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II-Honest but Unreasonable Mistake of Fact 
in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 484–86 (1987) (“If the first half [of the nineteenth] century saw 
little development or analysis of the self defense question, the second half began with an explosion of 
statutes, case law, and treatise writing which rapidly established the proposition, in a majority of states, 
that only a reasonable mistake as to the need to use deadly force would result in a self defense verdict, 
and that the unreasonably mistaken actor would suffer as a murderer.”).  
69 See Improvement in Fire-Arms, U.S. Patent No. X9430 (issued Feb. 25, 1836) (describing the 
“revolving gun” invented by Samuel Colt of Hartford, Connecticut). 
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easier to use and more deadly, their use in self-defense needed to be further 
circumscribed.70  Honest but unreasonable mistakes were no longer 
tolerated when the stakes escalated dramatically.  The rule quoted above 
from M’Naghten has been reversed in the vast majority of jurisdictions: 
“But if that honest belief is the product of a delusion or a misperception of 
a threat—where someone without similarly impaired cognitive abilities or 
misapprehensions would sense no danger—a defendant lacks legal grounds 
to assert self-defense.”71  More succinctly, “[b]y definition, a reasonable 
person is not one who hears voices due to severe mental illness.”72 
A person who is unable to make an objectively reasonable 
determination regarding the appropriateness of self-defense has a relatively 
weak claim for Second Amendment protection.  The Amendment first and 
foremost protects self-defense.73  Precisely in response to the danger of 
guns, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions now allow self-defense 
only when it is both subjectively and objectively reasonable.74  People 
suffering from delusions or hallucinations cannot be trusted to limit their 
self-defensive actions to circumstances where doing so is objectively 
reasonable.  Restricting their access to firearms therefore infringes less 
upon Second Amendment rights.75 
One familiar form of counter-argument is the slippery slope.  If 
delusional people have lesser Second Amendment rights, what about 
people with drinking problems,  anger problems, or simply below average 
intelligence?  Such people may not be capable of being objectively 
reasonable in their use of firearms.  To categorically exclude them from 
Second Amendment protection would go too far.  But one need not slide 
down the slope: a possible response to this concern is history.  Restrictions 
on gun possession by the mentally ill have been described favorably by the 
Court as “longstanding.”76  There are no longstanding prohibitions based 
on intoxication, anger, or intelligence. 
                                                                                                                          
70 See Singer, supra note 68, at 488 (explaining that the introduction of the gun, which is deadly at 
greater ranges than knives or swords, may have moved courts to adopt a reasonableness test). 
71 State v. Bellinger, 278 P.3d 975, 987 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). 
72 People v. Jefferson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 481 (Ct. App. 2004); accord Commonwealth v. 
Hinds, 927 N.E.2d 1009, 1015 (Mass. 2010) (declining to “interpret reasonable provocation as the 
subjective experience of provocation by a person whose anxiety has resulted in paranoia.”). 
73 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
74 Wagner, supra note 66, § 3, at 997–1006 (collecting cases). 
75 As noted above, a parallel argument under Indiana’s Constitution prevailed in Redington v. 
State.  See 992 N.E.2d 823, 834–35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“Indeed, the Act seeks to keep firearms from 
individuals it deems ‘dangerous’ if and when they present a risk of personal injury to either themselves 
or other individuals.  On that score, we also observe that, as discussed below, the State bears the burden 
of proving that the individual is ‘dangerous’ by a heightened clear and convincing evidence standard.  
We therefore conclude that the Act does not place a material burden upon the core value of Redington’s 
right to defend himself and accordingly that the Act is not unconstitutional as applied to Redington.” 
(citation omitted)). 
76 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
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If, despite these arguments to the contrary, the burden on Second 
Amendment rights is deemed to be great enough to clear the threshold, 
then my proposal might trigger intermediate scrutiny.  Is the measure 
substantially related to an important government interest?  The answer 
could well turn on emphasis.  People with delusions are much more prone 
to violence.  But the vast majority of people with delusions are not violent, 
and only a tiny fraction will misuse firearms.  Whether a particular court 
would be swayed by the heightened risk or the massive overbreadth is 
difficult to predict.77 
B.  Due Process 
Under my proposal, a police officer or mental health professional 
would provide a written notice to the affected individual explaining the 
basis for suspension of gun rights and the process to appeal or to seek 
restoration.  The individual would be entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
where he would have the burden to show that he was not in fact suffering 
from delusions or hallucinations, or that he was, but have since been found 
to be symptom-free by a mental health professional and to be receiving 
appropriate treatment.  Appeals would have to be filed within 90 days; 
motions for restoration could be filed at any time.  Gun rights would be 
suspended during the process. 
This scheme would not violate due process.  Given the exigency of 
the situation and the threat to health and safety, no predeprivation hearing 
is required.78  “[W]here a State must act quickly, or where it would be 
impractical to provide predeprivation process, postdeprivation process 
satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause.”79  Protecting public 
health and safety is an interest of paramount importance which has long 
justified summary deprivation of property.80  For the same reasons, 
suspension of gun rights during the postdeprivation process should be 
allowed.  Placing the burden of proof on the individual is appropriate 
                                                                                                                          
77 Cf. Vars & Young, supra note 14, at 17–19 (discussing the lack of uniformity among empirical 
studies with respect to the relationship between mental illness and violence, as well as the concern that 
using intermediate scrutiny in Second Amendment cases would disarm many harmless mentally ill 
persons).  In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor O’Shea suggests that the political affiliation 
of a judge’s appointing President may help predict the judge’s position in Second Amendment cases.  
Michael P. O’Shea, The Steepness of the Slippery Slope: Second Amendment Litigation in the Lower 
Federal Courts and What It Has to Do with Background Recordkeeping Legislation, 46 CONN. L. REV. 
1381, Part IV.E (2014).  
78 See Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2012) (rejecting the appellant’s 
claim “that due process required that a hearing take place before her license could be revoked” because 
the “predeprivation process provided . . . was constitutionally adequate when considered in conjunction 
with the available postdeprivation process”). 
79 Id. at 84 (quoting Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
80 Id. at 84–85. 
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because that individual will be in the best position to produce relevant 
evidence.81  Furthermore, requiring certification from a mental health 
professional may induce some individuals who want their gun rights 
restored to go into treatment or at least to submit to evaluation.  This would 
be a significant policy advantage over current diagnosis- and treatment-
based restrictions that may actually discourage beneficial treatment.82 
V.  POLICY COUNTER-ARGUMENTS 
What I have described as the fundamental shortcoming of the 
diagnosis-based approach—requiring a diagnosis—could be alternatively 
described as its greatest virtue.  Mental health professionals are trained to 
make accurate diagnoses and thus to ensure that only those who actually 
have disorders are barred from gun possession.  Allowing police officers to 
disqualify people because they suspect delusions or hallucinations requires 
them to act beyond their expertise. 
There are at least two responses.  First, it is relatively easy to identify 
an active delusion or hallucination, so the police would not need the formal 
mental health training needed to diagnose mental illness.  Alexis’s fear of a 
microwave attack demonstrates that there will be easy cases, even if police 
may sometimes be unsure whether a strange belief is in fact based in 
reality.  Second, even if one concedes that law enforcement will not do as 
well as mental health professionals in identifying delusions and 
hallucinations, a flawed assessment by law enforcement is better than 
failing to prevent tragic violence.  As mentioned above, vast numbers of 
people with mental health problems do not receive treatment.83  To wait for 
them to get psychiatric care is to roll the dice on what they will do in the 
meantime. 
Giving mental health professionals the power to take away guns and 
gun rights is arguably objectionable for a different reason: the potential 
“chilling effect” on the therapeutic relationship.  One recent study found 
that imposing a mandatory duty on psychologists to warn others about 
threats posed by patients corresponded to a nine percent increase in teen 
suicides.84  The study’s author suggests that teens may have been less 
                                                                                                                          
81 See id. at 87 (suggesting that the Massachusetts legislature could have reasonably placed the 
burden of proof on the aggrieved individual because he would be in the best place to present relevant 
evidence as to the suitability requirement). 
82 See Thomas B. Cole, Efforts to Prevent Gun Sales to Mentally Ill May Deter Patients from 
Seeking Help, 298 JAMA 503, 504 (2007) (discussing the NICS Improvement Act of 2007, and 
suggesting that the Act’s push to enter mental health-related information into a federal database “may 
make some patients uneasy” about pursuing treatment due to the stigma that is sometimes associated 
with being labeled mentally ill).  
83 See supra text accompanying note 31.  
84 Griffin Edwards, Tarasoff, Duty to Warn Laws, and Suicide, 34 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 5 
(2013). 
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willing to disclose suicidal thoughts to their therapists when the teens knew 
that such disclosures might not remain confidential.85  Whether such a 
substantial chilling effect would materialize in the gun context is an 
important consideration in evaluating my proposal.  Limiting the proposal 
to police officers would eliminate this concern. 
Another related counter-argument to my proposal is that psychotic 
symptoms are a bad proxy.  If dangerousness is the concern, then bar gun 
possession based on an assessment of dangerousness.  That was the 
approach adopted in New York following the Newtown, Connecticut, 
school shooting.86  New York now authorizes revocation of gun privileges 
based on a mental health professional’s assessment of dangerousness with 
no explicit diagnosis requirement.87  Indiana had earlier authorized law 
enforcement officers to confiscate firearms based on dangerousness with or 
without a diagnosis of mental illness.88 
Assessing dangerousness, like making a diagnosis, arguably does 
require real mental health expertise.  Presumably, as a result, New York 
limits this power to mental health professionals.89  This may be sound 
public policy as far as it goes, although clinical assessments of 
dangerousness are notoriously unreliable.90  One additional problem is that 
                                                                                                                          
85 Id. at 7. 
86 See Michael Ollove, States Tackle Mental Illness and Gun Ownership, PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/states-tackle-mental-
illness-and-gun-ownership-85899461407 (reporting that “New York was the first state to adopt new 
gun control measures in the aftermath of the December shooting massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary 
School in Newtown, Conn.” by passing legislation with the “most expansive language in the United 
States for keeping gun ownership from people with mental illness” and only requiring mental health 
professionals to tell local officials that they believe a patient is likely to hurt himself or others, rather 
than requiring a court determination).  
87 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.46(b) (McKinney 2013).  California has recently adopted a 
similar provision, barring gun possession by any individual who makes a serious threat to a 
psychotherapist.  See Patrick McGreevy & Melanie Mason, Brown Kills New Limits on Gun Sales, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2013, at A1 (“[T]he Governor accepted a bill prohibiting gun ownership by people who 
make serious threats to psychotherapists”).  
88 IND. CODE §§ 35-47-14-2 to -3 (2013); see also George F. Parker, Application of a Firearm 
Seizure Law Aimed at Dangerous Persons: Outcomes From the First Two Years, 61 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVS. 478, 478 (2010) (studying early data relating to firearm seizures under the Indiana statute and 
concluding that seizures rarely resulted from psychosis, but instead were connected to a risk of suicide). 
89 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.46 (allowing only “mental health professional[s]” under the 
meaning of that section to report a patient as dangerous if the patient is likely to act in a way that would 
harm himself or others). 
90 See Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing: 
Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious Decision-Making, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 
63, 85–86 (2005) (discussing the “high level of inaccuracy” when mental health professionals predict 
dangerousness and noting that it is very difficult to truly test accuracy because “there is no way of 
knowing how many times a particular expert was right or wrong in his or her predictions of future 
dangerousness”); Henry J. Steadman, From Dangerousness to Risk Assessment of Community 
Violence: Taking Stock at the Turn of the Century, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 265, 269–70 
(2000) (similar). 
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it does not go far enough.  The New York law would not have stopped 
Alexis from buying the fatal shotgun.  No mental health professional 
assessed Alexis and found him dangerous.  This is more than an anecdote.  
Literally millions of Americans with mental illness are not receiving 
mental health treatment.  Some of them are psychotic and many come in 
contact with law enforcement. 
Indiana has made the right choice in empowering police officers to 
sometimes curb gun rights.  However, Indiana’s choice of standard may 
not be optimal.  Dangerousness is difficult to define, let alone assess, even 
by trained experts.  There is real potential for police abuse of such a 
discretionary authority.  But even assuming reliable assessment free from 
abuse, a per se rule regarding delusions and hallucinations, along the lines 
suggested herein, may be a useful supplement to dangerousness.  A 
psychotic individual may not appear immediately dangerous but is 
probably still unable to be objectively reasonable in using a firearm. 
A final counter-argument is that the federal background check system 
is too porous to make a difference.  No background check is required for 
private sales, which make up a substantial portion of gun transactions.91  
One might therefore expect mental health restrictions on purchases from 
licensed dealers to have little or no effect.  However, recent experience 
suggests that this is not the case.  “In those with a gun-disqualifying mental 
health record, risk of violent criminal offending declined significantly after 
Connecticut began reporting gun-disqualifying mental health records to the 
[federal background check system].”92  The cost of switching to a private 
sale apparently deters some gun purchases.  Of course, expanding the 
background check system would maximize the effectiveness of my 
proposal, but the proposal is still likely to have a positive impact in the 
meantime. 
                                                                                                                          
91 See Stephen Davis & Bryan Polcyn, Guns for Sale: No Background Check Required, 
FOX6NOW.COM (Nov. 7, 2013), http://fox6now.com/2013/11/07/guns-for-sale-no-background-check-
required/ (“Over the past 15 years, the FBI has processed more than 100-million criminal background 
checks on potential gun buyers.  But those checks only apply to the sale of guns through a federally 
licensed firearms dealer.  Don’t want a background check?  No problem.  Just buy from a private seller 
instead.”); Universal Background Checks & the Private Sale Loophole Policy Summary, LAW CENTER 
TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Aug. 21, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/private-sales-policy-summary/ 
(“The most dangerous gap in federal firearms laws today is the ‘private sale’ loophole.  Although 
federal law requires licensed firearms dealers to perform background checks on prospective purchasers 
and maintain records of all gun sales, unlicensed ‘private’ sellers do not have to do either.  An 
estimated 40% of all firearms sold in the U.S. are transferred by unlicensed ‘private’ sellers.”). 
92 Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Preventing Gun Violence Involving People with Serious Mental 
Illness, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: INFORMING POLICY WITH EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS 
33, 45 (Daniel W. Webster & Jon S. Vernick eds., 2013). 
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* * * 
Most delusions are harmless and invisible.93  Some of the more 
serious ones will come to the attention of the police.  If they do, then the 
officer should suspend gun rights.  This proposal would likely have 
prevented Alexis from purchasing the shotgun used in the Navy Yard 
shooting.  It is grounded in empirical work showing that psychotic 
symptoms can predict violence better than diagnosis does.  And there is an 
additional constitutional argument for this symptom-based approach 
derived from principles of self-defense.  A person suffering from delusions 
or hallucinations cannot be trusted to use a firearm defensively in an 
objectively reasonable fashion. 
Prevention, however, comes with a price.  Many who would never 
misuse a firearm will have their access to guns curtailed.  Whether this 
approach would ultimately survive legal scrutiny may be an open question, 
but it would appear a promising enough policy direction to warrant further 
consideration. 
                                                                                                                          
93 Jeffrey Swanson & Marvin Swartz, The Navy Yard Shooting and Mental Illness, CLINICAL 
PSYCHIATRY NEWS (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.clinicalpsychiatrynews.com/index.php?id=2407&cHa
sh=071010&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=216831 (explaining that post-Heller, the United States faces the 
difficult task of trying to keep guns out of the hands of certain “dangerous people”; that “we often don’t 
know who the dangerous people are (until it’s too late), and the people that we might assume to be 
dangerous (say because they have a mental illness) mostly are not”; and that psychiatrists’ predictions 
of gun violence “aren’t much better than a coin toss” so “reducing gun violence in the tiny proportion 
of mentally ill individuals at risk is a vexing challenge”). 
